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Drawing upon cognitive appraisal theory of emotions in conjunction with incentive 
pay research, I examine the mechanisms and boundary conditions for the effects of 
group leaders’ differentiated development of leader-member exchange (LMX) 
relationship on group coordination and performance. I propose that it is when groups 
receive a higher average proportion of group, as opposed to individual, incentive pay 
that LMX differentiation is more likely to foster group climate of admiration, rather 
than envy, which then enhances group coordination and subsequent performance. 
Using data on 828 sales groups in a major Chinese retailer, I find evidence that 
groups’ use of group, rather than individual or hybrid (i.e., [1] incentive pay based on 
individual and group performance or [2] incentive pay based on individual, group, 
and store performance), incentive pay with a higher average proportion in total pay 
  
facilitated LMX differentiation to improve group coordination by cultivating group 
admiration climate. Also, group, as opposed to individual or hybrid, incentive pay 
buffered the negative effects of group envy climate on group coordination. Lastly, it 
was found that group coordination predicted groups’ six-month lagged sales 
performance above and beyond prior sales performance. Several theoretical and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation and Purpose 
Work group leaders distribute various work resources to group members to 
increase the performance of their groups. One primary way for leaders to allocate 
work resources is by developing exchange relationships characterized by trust and 
respect, i.e., leader-member exchange (LMX), with group members (Graen & 
Scandura, 1987). In doing so, leaders differentiate among group members such that 
they forge higher quality relationships with some, not all, members, and provide more 
important roles along with commensurate resources to the selected members. This is 
not only because work resources are mostly limited (Bergeron, 2007), but also 
because equality of resource allocation among group members may sometimes cause 
inefficiency in the use of work resources (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 
1993). As such, leaders’ differentiated development or disparity of LMX within 
groups, which is termed LMX differentiation, has been widely acknowledged as a 
central feature of leadership behavior in work groups (Erdogan & Bauer, 2010; Liden, 
Erdogan, Wayne, & Sparrowe, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it still remains unclear whether leaders’ engaging in LMX 
differentiation helps or hurts an effective functioning of work groups. In particular, 
there exists a theoretical puzzle over the relationship between LMX differentiation 










group performance (Okhuysen & Becky, 2009; Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & 
Gibson, 2008). On the one hand, LMX differentiation may contribute to the group 
coordination by facilitating a clear division of roles, direction, and deference among 
group members (Liden et al., 2006; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). That is, leaders may 
enhance group coordination by assigning more important roles and more work 
resources to some group members who can make more contributions and be more 
trusted than others. This perspective is based upon role theory (Dienesch & Liden, 
1986; Liden et al., 2006) and social hierarchy theory (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  
On the other hand, LMX differentiation may undermine coordination of a 
work group by causing relational problems among its members. For instance, leaders’ 
favorable treatment of a few members may lead to relationship conflicts and lack of 
group cohesion, thereby impairing group coordination and ultimately performance 
(Hooper & Martin, 2008). In line with these contrasting theoretical views, empirical 
evidence on the impact of LMX differentiation on group-level outcomes is 
inconclusive (Le Blanc & González-Romá, 2012). 
This study aims to resolve this puzzle over the roles of LMX differentiation in 
work groups by examining the mechanisms and conditions where LMX 
differentiation contributes to the effectiveness of group coordination and resultant 
group performance. I note that there are a few prior studies on this issue, but they 
have largely focused on cognitive variables related to justice perceptions such as 
perceived unfairness (Sias & Jablin, 1995) and justice climate (Erdogan & Bauer, 










groups’ affective mechanisms for the effects of LMX differentiation based upon the 
cognitive appraisal theory of emotions (Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990) and theory 
of social comparison-based emotions (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Smith, 2000) in 
particular. 
Further, I integrate the theory of social comparison-based emotions and 
compensation literature (Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009) to examine boundary 
conditions for the effects of LMX differentiation on group affective mechanisms and 
coordination. Specifically, I investigate the impact of LMX differentiation in the 
context of different incentive pay practices, which constitute another important mode 
of resource allocation in work groups (Gerhart et al., 2009), and posit that the impact 
of LMX differentiation on group affective mechanisms (i.e., group climates 
characterized by admiration and envy among group members) and coordination may 
vary depending on the nature (i.e., types and the extent of use) of incentive pay 
practices. 
1.2. Intended Contributions of the Study 
This study makes three important contributions to leadership, compensation, 
and emotions literature. First, it extends the leadership literature and LMX research in 
particular by revealing unexplored mediators and moderators for the effects of LMX 
differentiation in work group context. As noted above, although LMX differentiation 
has been considered “the norm in work groups” (Anand, Vidyarthi, Liden, & 










differentiation as a focal study variable (Henderson, Liden, Glibkowski, & Chaudhry, 
2009). Further, the few studies on LMX differentiation largely focused on its 
outcomes such as group performance rather than intervening mechanisms and 
moderating conditions (e.g., Liden et al., 2006). Hence, by shedding light on a novel 
mediator and moderator for the effects of LMX differentiation, this study will 
enhance our understandings on how LMX differentiation operates in work group 
settings.  
Second, the present study advances the compensation literature by unveiling 
the roles of incentive pay to serve as a condition for the emergence and impact of 
groups’ affective processes—i.e., group climates of admiration and envy. Prior 
research on incentive pay has typically focused on establishing its performance 
effects at either individual- or organizational-level (Gerhart et al., 2009; see for 
exception Pearsall, Christian, & Ellis, 2010). In doing so, it has paid relatively little 
attention to affective or emotional outcomes of incentive pay as intermediate 
mechanisms relating to its performance effects. This study shows that work groups’ 
incentive pay based on group, rather than individual, performance plays a critical role 
for the occurrence of the groups’ affective climates of admiration and envy and their 
impact on group coordination.  
Lastly, this study contributes to the body of research on emotions and social 
comparison-based emotions in particular (Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith & Kim, 2007) by 
conceptualizing feelings of admiration and envy as group-level constructs and 










emerging interests in group-level emotions such as group emotions (Kelly & Barsade, 
2001) and group affective tone (Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005), extant research on 
admiration and envy has been typically conducted at an individual-level. Further, 
prior studies on group-level emotions have largely focused on contagion or 
sharedness of individual emotions among group members (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Sy et 
al., 2005). Hence, my conceptualization of admiration and envy as group affective 
climate constructs develops previous research on admiration and envy in new 
directions.  
1.3. Chapter Outline 
In what follows, I first provide an overview of extant theories and research on 
LMX differentiation, social comparison-based emotions, group affective climate, and 
incentive pay in Chapter 2. Then, I provide definitions of key study variables and 
propose a theoretical model in Chapter 3 where group leaders’ engaging in LMX 
differentiation fosters the emergence of group admiration and envy climate to a 
different degree depending on the types and average proportion of incentive pay. The 
group admiration and envy climates are then hypothesized to relate to group 
coordination in a positive and negative way, respectively, which then affects 
performance of the groups. This theoretical framework is empirically tested using 
data from 828 sales groups in a major Chinese home appliance retailer. Detailed 
information about research site, sample, survey translation, measures, discriminant 










information about descriptive statistics and hypotheses testing results. Lastly, I 
summarize key findings and offer theoretical and empirical implications of the 
findings along with several limitations and future research directions in Chapter 6. 
After Chapter 6, I include a copy of Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval letter 
and an English version of actual survey questionnaires in Appendices, followed by a 










Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1. Extant Research on LMX Differentiation 
As I noted earlier, prior empirical studies on LMX have largely focused on 
level or quality of LMX rather than dispersion of LMX within work groups (Erdogan 
& Bauer, 2010; Henderson et al., 2009). However, a growing body of research has 
examined LMX differentiation as a focal study variable at both individual and group 
levels. Specifically, at the individual-level, leadership scholars have examined the 
effects of LMX differentiation on various kinds of employee attitudinal and 
behavioral outcomes. As a result, they first revealed that LMX differentiation may 
have negative impact on employees’ relationship with peers, which then negatively 
influences their attitudes. For example, Hooper and Martin (2008) found that 
employees’ perceived LMX differentiation may foster relationship conflict among 
them, which in turn impair their job satisfaction and well-being. In a similar vein, 
Sherony and Green (2002) found that differences in LMX among coworkers led to 
poorer exchange relationship among them.  
Second, scholars have further found that the effects of LMX differentiation on 
employee attitudes and behavior may be contingent upon levels of justice climate in 
work groups. For example, Erdogan and Bauer (2010) found that LMX differentiation 
negatively related organizational commitment, satisfaction with coworkers, and 










positively related to helping behaviors toward coworkers when distributive justice 
climate was high. In addition, it was also found that the effects of LMX 
differentiation on employees’ job performance varied depending on levels of their 
levels of LMX. For example, Liden and colleagues (2006) found that LMX 
differentiation positively related to employee job performance only for those with low 
LMX. When employees had high levels of LMX, LMX differentiation did not lead to 
any change in their job performance.  
A related body of research has focused on relative LMX (or RLMX), defined 
as a divergence between a focal employee’s LMX and group’s average level of LMX, 
and found that RLMX may affect employees’ psychological contract fulfillment when 
groups’ LMX differentiation is high (Henderson, Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 
2008), their social identification and job performance (Tse, Ashkanasy, & 
Dasborough, 2012), and their social comparison perceptions which then influence 
their job performance and organizational citizenship behavior (Vidyarthi, Liden, 
Anand, Erdogan, & Ghosh, 2010). These studies suggest that if leaders engage in 
LMX differentiation to a greater degree, it may lead to a divergence among 
employees in terms of their attitudes and performance.  
At the group-level, I found that much less attention has been paid to the 
effects of LMX differentiation (Le Blanc & González-Romá, 2012). First, the few 
studies failed to find main effects of LMX differentiation on group performance (Le 
Blanc & González-Romá, 2012; Liden et al., 2006). Rather, the effects of LMX 










that LMX differentiation was positively related to group performance when the group 
mean LMX was low (Le Blanc & González-Romá, 2012; Liden et al., 2006). Stewart 
and Johnson (2009) further found that the interactive effects of LMX differentiation 
and group mean LMX on group performance were moderated by group diversity such 
that the interactive effects were stronger for more diverse groups in terms of gender.  
In contrast to the above studies in which the performance effects of LMX 
differentiation were more positive under low level of group mean LMX, Boies and 
Howell (2006) found that LMX differentiation negatively related to team potency and 
positively affected team conflict when groups’ mean LMX was low. Similarly, Van 
Breukelen and colleagues (2012) found that leaders’ differential treatment of 
followers on social issues negatively affected followers’ perceived team atmosphere, 
but the effects of task-related differential treatment on followers’ perceived team 
performance were mixed.  
Taken together, there has been relatively less attention paid to the effects of 
LMX differentiation, and the limited body of research on LMX differentiation has 
largely focused on its negative consequences on employees’ coworker relationship 
and attitudes, and the buffering roles of justice climate for the potential negative 
effects of LMX differentiation on employee attitudes and performance. At the group-
level, a few studies showed that LMX differentiation may lead to positive outcomes 
such as group performance under low level of group mean LMX, but some other 
studies found opposite or mixed effects on group-level outcomes. I extend this 










unexplored moderator for the effects of LMX differentiation and (2) novel mediating 
mechanisms based on groups’ affective states.  
2.2. Extant Research on Admiration and Envy 
Individuals’ feelings of admiration and envy have been studied by a group of 
psychologists and more recently by management scholars as their reactions to 
interpersonal or intergroup social comparisons (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 2000; 
Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994; Tai, Narayanan, & McAllister, 2012). 
Specifically, they have been considered two typical emotional states that individuals 
and groups may experience when they compare themselves with superior others 
(Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 2000).  
Admiration refers to upward assimilative emotions directed toward others 
with superior outcomes and consists of a sense of inspiration, pride, respect, and 
pleased approval (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). There has 
been only a limited number of empirical studies on admiration. For example, Cuddy 
and colleagues (2007) found that people feel admiration toward a group of people 
who are perceived warm and competent, which in turn leads to both active and 
passive facilitation toward the admired others. Similarly, Fiske and colleagues (2002) 
found that people do not admire others who are perceived neither competent, nor 
warm. Also, Algoe and Haidt (2009) provided evidence that feelings of admiration 
leads to individuals’ motivation to improve themselves. However, this was 










effects of admiration on self-improvement.  
 Unlike admiration, envy has received relatively more attention not only from 
psychologists but from management scholars. Envy is generally defined as a painful 
feeling characterized by inadequacy and inferiority (Smith & Kim, 2007). First, 
regarding antecedents of envy, Vecchio (2005) examined employees’ job longevity, 
Machiavellianism, and sense of competitive reward as possible predictors of feeling 
envied by others, and identified self-esteem, Machiavellianism, LMX, sense of 
competitive reward, and job dissatisfaction as antecedents of feeling envy toward 
others. Schaubroeck and Lam (2004) found that employees felt envy toward 
promotees who were similar to themselves and when they had high promotion 
expectations. They also identified a few outcomes of envy by revealing that 
promotion envy led employees to perceive reward allocation injustice, but enhanced 
their job performance. Further, Duffy and Shaw (2000) found that group members’ 
average level of envy was negatively associated with group performance by 
positively relating to social loafing and negatively relating to cohesiveness and 
potency. Also, Cuddy and colleagues (2007) found that envy may foster anger which 
then leads to engaging in active harm. In a more recent study, Duffy and colleagues 
(2012) found that envy may foster social undermining through employees’ moral 
disengagement, particularly when they have low social identification with their 
coworkers and when teams are low in team identification and high in team 










Taken together, extant research on admiration and envy has largely focused on 
exploring individual-level predictors and outcomes. This study extends this body of 
research by taking admiration and envy to group-level and identifying their novel 
antecedents and outcomes in work group settings.  
2.3. Extant Research on Affective Climate 
 Although emotion has been typically studied as a micro-level (i.e., intra-
individual-, individual-, or interpersonal-level) phenomenon (Elfenbein, 2007), a 
growing body of research has conceptualized emotion at group-level and examined 
the processes of its emergence as well as its impact on various group outcomes. For 
example, in their review article, Kelly and Barsade (2001) suggested several implicit 
emotional sharing processes such as emotional contagion, vicarious affect, behavioral 
entrainment and interaction synchrony, as well as explicit processes including 
intentional affective induction/influence and affective impression management.  
Some parts of their model were empirically tested. For example, Barsade (2002) 
examined how emotions are shared among group members through conscious and 
subconscious contagion processes and how such shared emotions affect group 
behaviors and performance. Likewise, Bartel and Saavedra (2000) hypothesized and 
found that group members display and detect mood information through behavioral 
cues, thus leading to mood convergence in groups. Group members’ shared feelings 
have been conceptualized as group affective tone that is defined as homogenous 










and colleagues’ (2005) study, leader’s mood influenced group members’ mood 
convergence, thereby inducing group affective tone which then affected group 
coordination and effort expenditure.  
 While the mood or emotion convergence has been a primary approach to 
conceptualizing group-level emotions, there has an emerging body of research that 
examines emotions in a work group as affective group climate constructs. Broadly, 
organizational climate is defined as organizational members’ shared perceptions of 
organization attributes (Reichers & Schneider, 1990). Put differently, it refers to 
“shared perceptions of the way things are around here” and is different from 
psychological climate that concerns individuals’ own perceptions of work 
environment (Reicher & Schneider, 1990, p. 20). Extant research on organizational 
climate has largely focused on employees’ shared perceptions of specific 
organizational practices and procedures such as climate for service that is defined as 
employees’ shared perceptions of practices and procedures rewarding and supporting 
their delivery of quality service (Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998) and climate for 
safety which refers to employees’ shared perceptions of practices and procedures 
emphasizing organizational safety (Zohar & Luria, 2005) among others.  
 Applying the concept of organizational climate to group emotional 
phenomena, Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003) proposed the notion of affective 
climate as shared perceptions of emotion among organizational members and 
examined climate of fear as a work unit-level construct. Likewise, Tse, Dasborough, 










enthusiastic and warm as a moderator for the effects of LMX on workplace friendship. 
This study draws upon this line of research on affective climate and adds to it by 
examining antecedents and outcomes of group affective climates in terms of 
admiration and envy. 
2.4. Extant Research on Incentive Pay 
 A great deal of research has examined the outcomes of incentive pay for 
several decades (see for review Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009; Rynes, Gerhart, & 
Parks, 2005). Specifically, previous research has extensively investigated incentive 
and sorting effects of various kinds of incentive pay practices such as individual 
performance-based pay (e.g., merit pay), group or unit performance-based pay (e.g., 
gainsharing), and organizational performance-based pay (e.g., profit-sharing). Despite 
the extensiveness of empirical studies on incentive pay, their focus was 
predominantly on performance effects of incentive pay programs with relatively less 
attention paid to mediating mechanisms behind the performance effects (Gerhart et al., 
2009). Further, the limited research on the mediating mechanisms generally focused 
on cognitive or behavioral process variables such as personal goals and goal 
commitment (Wright, 1989) and information allocation and social loafing (Pearsall et 
al., 2010) rather than affective or emotional mechanisms. This study extends the large 
body of research on incentive pay by proposing and finding that groups’ incentive 










coordination and performance by affecting the emergence and impact of group 










Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the puzzle over the effects of LMX differentiation 
on group coordination. As noted above, on the one hand, LMX differentiation may 
enhance group coordination by facilitating division of roles, responsibilities, and 
direction among group members. On the other hand, it may impair group coordination 
by creating relational problems among them. I suggest that these two divergent 
perspectives on the effects of LMX differentiation are built upon different 
assumptions about groups’ responses to leader’s engaging in LMX differentiation. 
The first view assumes that groups approve the LMX differentiation, such that group 
members accept their own roles and resources as well as those of others distributed by 
the LMX differentiation. By contrast, the latter view assumes that groups challenge 
the current state of LMX distribution, such that group members compete for better 
roles and more resources than those of their coworkers. These different responses of 
work groups to the same event, i.e., LMX differentiation, can be explained by the 
cognitive appraisal theory of emotions (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman 
et al., 1990). Since LMX differentiation tends to create social comparison situations 
in work groups (Vidyarthi et al., 2010), I draw upon the cognitive appraisal 
perspective in the social comparison situations (i.e., theory of social comparison-
based emotions; Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 2000) in conjunction with incentive pay 










differential responses to LMX differentiation and their influences on group 
coordination and performance. Below I provide an overview of each of the three 
theoretical perspectives in turn.  
3.1. Theoretical Backgrounds 
3.1.1. Cognitive appraisal theory of emotions. This theory suggests that 
individuals’ evaluations of the events or situations, rather than the events or situations 
per se, determine whether or not they will feel an emotion and which emotion they 
will feel (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1990). Put differently, two individuals 
may experience the same emotional states even when they are in different situations 
as long as their appraisals of the situations are the same. Likewise, two individuals 
may feel different emotions even when they are in the same situation if they interpret 
the situation in different ways (Roseman et al., 1990). Building upon this perspective, 
I suggest that group members may respond differently with different emotional states 
to their leader’s display of LMX differentiation.  
3.1.2. Theory of social comparison-based emotions. Since group leader’s 
differentiated development of LMX may trigger social comparisons among group 
members (Vidyarthi et al., 2010), I draw upon theory of social comparison-based 
emotions (Smith, 2000) which is a specific application of the cognitive appraisal 
theory of emotions to social comparison situations. This perspective suggests that 
people tend to feel either admiration or envy when they compare themselves with 
others who have superior outcomes and/or qualities (Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 










work resources to a few group members who can be trusted more and make more 
contributions to a group, it will lead to group members’ upward social comparisons 
toward the few select members and thus induce their feelings of admiration and/or 
envy. Furthermore, the theory of social comparison-based emotions suggests that the 
extent to which upward social comparisons give rise to admiration and/or envy 
depends on outcome interdependence among individuals. Specifically, they are more 
likely to experience admiration when their outcomes vary depending on others’ 
outcomes (i.e., high outcome interdependence), whereas they tend to feel envy when 
their outcomes are determined irrespective of others’ outcomes (i.e., low outcome 
interdependence) (Smith, 2000).  
3.1.3. Incentive pay research. Extant theory and research in compensation suggests 
that incentive pay is a primary way to determine outcome interdependence among 
individuals (Wageman, 1995, 2001; Wageman & Baker, 1997). When group 
members’ compensation is determined by group (versus individual) performance, 
they will experience high (versus low) level of outcome interdependence. For this 
reason, I integrate theory of social comparison-based emotions and incentive pay 
research to develop hypotheses in my theoretical framework.  
3.2. Definitions of Key Study Variables 
3.2.1. LMX differentiation. This is generally defined as a within-group dispersion of 
LMX among group members (Erdogan & Bauer, 2010; Henderson et al., 2009). Prior 
studies conceptualized LMX differentiation as a separation concept according to 










deviation within a group. A separation refers to differences in opinion or position 
among group members such that high level of separation indicates a greater extent of 
disagreement or opposition among them (Harrison & Klein, 2007). However, LMX 
does not usually reflect a position or opinion so much as a valued asset that can give 
group members with high quality LMX an access to more work resources and higher 
status (Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997). Put differently, LMX is considered a 
primary way by which work resources are distributed among group members wherein 
high LMX is usually instrumental for obtaining valued outcomes at workplace (Liden 
et al., 1997; Sparrowe & Liden, 2005). Hence, LMX differentiation is conceptually a 
disparity that is defined as within-group concentration of valued resources such as 
power and status. Therefore, I define LMX differentiation as within-group 
differences in concentration of LMX (i.e., within-group disparity of LMX) and 
operationalize it accordingly.  
3.2.2. Group affective climates. In consistent with Ashkanasy and colleagues’ 
studies (Ashkanasy & Nicholson, 2003; Tse et al., 2011), I define group affective 
climate as shared perceptions of emotions in a group by its members. Specifically, 
group admiration climate refers to group members’ shared perceptions about the 
degree to which group members admire each other in a typical week at work. 
Likewise, group envy climate is defined as the extent to which group members envy 
each other in a typical week at work. These conceptualizations based on shared 
perceptions of emotions among group members are different from other concepts of 










affective tone (e.g., Sy et al., 2005) that concern sharedness of a focal emotion itself 
among group members.  
3.2.3. Types of incentive pay. This study focuses on two kinds of incentive pay—
i.e., group incentive pay and individual incentive pay. Group incentive pay refers to 
incentive pay in which group members are rewarded on the basis of group 
performance such that they receive an equal share from group performance 
improvements, whereas individual incentive pay indicates individual performance-
based pay in which group members are rewarded differentially in accordance with 
their individual performance (Gerhart et al., 2009). Group and individual 
performance can be based on results- and/or behavior-based measures. In other 
words, the theoretical rationales behind my hypotheses are more general and do not 
depend on types of performance measures.  
3.2.4. Average proportion of incentive pay. Employees’ compensation consists of 
multiple elements based on their seniority, competency, job, position, and 
performance among others (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Thus, each employee tends to 
have different proportion of performance-based incentive pay in his/her total 
compensation. Since this study examines the effects of LMX differentiation at group-
level, average proportion of incentive pay is defined as group average of each group 
member’s proportion of incentive pay. Also, since each group is under different type 
of incentive pay, “incentive pay” in this variable refers to each group’s respective 










3.2.5. Group coordination. This concerns the process of interactions by group 
members that integrate their contributions toward a group goal by articulating plans, 
defining their individual roles, responsibilities, and control, negotiating deadlines, 
and sharing information (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; Rico et al., 2008). Group 
coordination has been considered not only a primary mechanism for group 
effectiveness (Rico et al., 2008), but also a central purpose of an organization 
(Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).  
3.2.6. Group performance. Group performance in this study refers to sales 
performance because my sample is drawn from sales groups from a large Chinese 
home appliance retailer.  
3.3. Effects of LMX Differentiation on Group Affective Climates 
Research on LMX and social comparisons suggests that group members often 
compare leaders’ treatments of themselves to those of other members to evaluate their 
status in work groups (Vidyarthi et al., 2010). As a result, they may feel admiration 
and/or envy toward other members with higher LMX because admiration and envy 
are considered two primary emotions that arise from upward social comparisons 
(Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 2000). Admiration refers to a feeling of inspiration, 
respect, and pride directed toward those with superior outcomes (Cuddy et al., 2007), 
and envy is a painful feeling characterized by inferiority caused by a comparison with 
someone(s) having superior outcomes (Tai et al., 2012).  
Hence, in work groups, the more leaders differentiate among members in 










coworkers. Since LMX is more concentrated on a few select members when leaders 
engage in higher levels of LMX differentiation, groups will consist of a greater 
number of members who feel admiration towards the few higher LMX coworkers. 
Further, under higher levels of LMX differentiation, the average distance among 
group members in terms of levels of LMX becomes larger. Thus, group members 
with lower LMX may feel stronger admiration toward the higher LMX coworkers. 
Likewise, under higher levels of LMX differentiation, groups will have more 
members who envy higher LMX members to a greater degree. As a result, it is more 
likely that group members’ feelings of admiration and envy are displayed and 
communicated among them under higher (versus lower) LMX differentiation, thereby 
promoting the emergence of their shared perceptions about overall degree of group 
members’ admiring and envying each other, which I define as group climates of 
admiration and envy, respectively, in consistent with an emerging body of research on 
group affective climate (e.g., Ashkanasy, & Nicholson, 2003; Tse et al., 2008). Based 
on this reasoning, I propose:  
Hypothesis 1a: Group leaders’ LMX differentiation will be positively related 
to group climate of admiration. 
Hypothesis 1b: Group leaders’ LMX differentiation will be positively related 










3.4. 1st Stage Moderating Effects of Incentive Pay 
 As noted above, LMX differentiation has been conceived as a mechanism for 
leaders to differentially allocate group resources to its members (Graen & Scandura, 
1987; Liden et al., 1997; Sparrowe & Liden, 2005). While various kinds of resources 
can be distributed via LMX (e.g., roles, information, and support), there exists 
another important resource that LMX may not have direct impact on its allocation—
i.e., money (Wilson, Sin, & Conlon, 2010). Money (i.e., financial reward) is typically 
distributed based on a group’s pay practices. Specifically, group members can be 
rewarded either equally based on group performance (i.e., group incentive pay) or 
differentially based on their individual performance (i.e., individual incentive pay; 
Gerhart et al., 2009). Hence, groups’ incentive pay practices can also differentiate 
among group members to a different degree and thus may play a role in the 
differentiation processes by LMX.  
 More importantly, theory of social comparison-based emotions suggests that 
the extent to which individuals’ engaging in upward social comparisons gives rise to 
admiration and/or envy may depend on outcome interdependence among them 
(Smith, 2000). When individuals’ outcomes (e.g., rewards) are determined jointly by 
others’ decisions and actions (i.e., high outcome interdependence), they will more 
likely admire rather than envy superior others. By contrast, when outcome 
interdependence is low, individuals are more likely to envy rather than admire the 
superior others. Since outcome interdependence in work groups can be created by 










individual, incentive pay (Gerhart et al., 2009), I examine these two types of incentive 
pay as key moderators for the effects of LMX differentiation.  
 Specifically, I propose that LMX differentiation will lead to a higher level of 
group climate of admiration under group incentive pay. People feel admiration when 
others’ superior outcomes do not detract from themselves (Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 
2000). Since group members under group incentive pay are rewarded equally 
regardless of their levels of LMX, they will benefit from higher LMX members who 
usually take on more important roles and make more contributions to group 
performance (Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009; Sparrowe & Liden, 2005). 
Conversely, under individual incentive pay, group members tend to compete with 
each other for higher performance and resultant more rewards. Hence, group, rather 
than individual, incentive pay will facilitate the LMX differentiation to foster group 
members’ overall degree of admiring, thereby boosting its effects on the development 
of group admiration climate. 
Second, LMX differentiation will less likely lead to groups’ envy climate 
under group incentive pay. Since group incentive pay rewards group members equally 
no matter what LMX each member has, it will render the differences in LMX among 
members less important and less salient to them. Therefore, LMX differentiation will 
less likely lead lower LMX members to feel inadequate and inferior. By contrast, 
when rewarded on the basis of individual contributions, higher LMX members may 
be paid more because they tend to perform better (Sparrowe & Liden, 2005; Zhang, 










members to feel more inadequate and inferior (Tai et al., 2012). Therefore, group, 
rather than individual, incentive pay will hinder LMX differentiation to promote 
group members’ overall degree of envying, thereby weakening its effects on the 
emergence of group envy climate. Together, I propose:  
Hypothesis 2a: Groups’ use of group (versus individual) incentive pay will 
strengthen the positive relationship between LMX differentiation and group 
climate of admiration specified in Hypothesis 1a.  
Hypothesis 2b: Groups’ use of group (versus individual) incentive pay will 
weaken the positive relationship between LMX differentiation and group 
climate of envy specified in Hypothesis 1b. 
While Hypotheses 2a and 2b concern the moderating effects of types of 
incentive pay, another important element in incentive pay design is the proportion of 
incentive pay in total pay of employees (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Because of several 
possible impediments to raising ratio of incentive pay (e.g., employees’ ability to 
control performance measures and inaccuracy of performance measures), 
organizations use incentive pay practices with a varying intensity (Zenger & 
Marshall, 2000). Hence, even when work groups claim to use the same type of 
incentive pay, they may implement it differently by using different proportions of 
incentive pay in employees’ total compensation. If payouts from incentive pay take 
only a low proportion in total compensation, the hypothesized effects of incentive pay 
will be weaker. Put differently, since the significance of incentive pay practices in 










ratio of incentive pay, I suggest that the moderating effects of  group (versus 
individual) incentive pay will be magnified when groups consist of members whose 
ratio of the incentive pay is higher rather than lower. Therefore groups’ average ratio 
of incentive pay will serve as a three-way moderator in the following ways: 
Hypothesis 3a: Groups’ use of higher rather than lower average proportion of 
incentive pay will strengthen the interaction effects of LMX differentiation and 
group (versus individual) incentive pay on group climate of admiration 
specified in Hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 3b: Groups’ use of higher rather than lower average proportion of 
incentive pay will strengthen the interaction effects of LMX differentiation and 
group (versus individual) incentive pay on group climate of envy specified in 
Hypothesis 2b. 
3.5. Effects of Group Affective Climates on Group Coordination 
Group climates of admiration and envy will in turn affect group coordination 
that concerns integrating individual members’ contributions to achieve group goals by 
defining individual roles and responsibilities and aligning individual actions (Rico et 
al., 2008). First, high levels of admiration climate will reflect high degree of group 
members’ overall feelings of admiration. More importantly, the admiration climate 
will signal to group members that admiring other members is valued and expected in 
the work groups (Zohar, 2000). And, it is when group members are admiring each 










responsibilities and be more willing to cooperate with each other (Algoe & Haidt, 
2009), all of which can contribute to the effectiveness of group coordination (Rico et 
al., 2008).  
In a similar vein, high levels of envy climate will reflect high degree of group 
members’ overall envying. Further, it can promote group members’ feelings of envy 
by signaling that envying other members is acceptable in their work groups (Zohar, 
2000). However, it is when group members envy each other that they tend to be 
dissatisfied with the way that a leader differentiates among them in terms of LMX, 
may be motivated to challenge the current allocation of LMX by either promoting 
themselves (e.g., compete for more resources from the leader) or pulling others down 
(e.g., undermine others with higher LMX; Tai et al., 2012). Hence, group envy 
climate is likely to hurt group coordination (Kwaadsteniet & van Dijk, 2010). 
Therefore:  
Hypothesis 4a: Group climate of admiration will be positively related to 
group coordination. 
Hypothesis 4b: Group climate of envy will be negatively related to group 
coordination. 
3.6. 2nd Stage Moderating Effects of Incentive Pay 
Moreover, I argue that work groups’ incentive pay will moderate the effects of 
group climates of admiration and envy on group coordination. First, group incentive 










coordination because it provides further incentives for admiring members to 
cooperate with admired others more closely (Gerhart et al., 2009). That is, group 
members will be more willing to cooperate with the admired, superior others to 
enhance group performance so that they get paid more. Conversely, individual 
incentive pay will dampen the cooperation among group members even when they 
admire each other (Gerhart et al., 2009). 
Second, group incentive pay will weaken the negative effects of group envy 
climate on group coordination. Even when group climate of envy leads group 
members to envy each other, they will be less likely to withdraw from coordinating 
with others because such withdrawal will hurt group performance and thus reduce 
their reward under group incentive pay. To the contrary, individual incentive pay will 
augment the negative relationship between group envy climate and group 
coordination by leading envious members to focus more on the enhancement of their 
individual performance to address their envy, thereby further withdrawing from 
collaborating with others (Tai et al., 2012). Therefore:  
Hypothesis 5a: Groups’ use of group (versus individual) incentive pay will 
strengthen the positive relationship between group climate of admiration and 
group coordination specified in Hypothesis 4a.  
Hypothesis 5b: Groups’ use of group (versus individual) incentive pay will 
weaken the negative relationship between group climate of envy and group 










Further, as in Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I expect that the moderating effects of 
group incentive pay will be more pronounced when groups use the incentive pay to a 
greater extent. By contrast, if group members receive only a small amount of 
compensation from incentive pay, they will be less responsive to group (versus 
individual) incentive pay’s motivational forces for cooperation with admired and/or 
envied coworkers. Formally stated:  
Hypothesis 6a: Groups’ use of higher rather than lower average proportion of 
incentive pay will strengthen the interaction effects of group admiration 
climate and group (versus individual) incentive pay on group coordination 
specified in Hypothesis 5a. 
Hypothesis 6b: Groups’ use of higher rather than lower average proportion of 
incentive pay will strengthen the interaction effects of group envy climate and 
group (versus individual) incentive pay on group coordination specified in 
Hypothesis 5b. 
3.7. Moderated Mediation Effects 
 Given that group leaders’ LMX differentiation may affect group climates of 
admiration and envy, which in turn may influence group coordination, I suggest that 
LMX differentiation will be indirectly linked to group coordination via group 
climates of admiration and envy. Specifically, since both the relationship between 
LMX differentiation and group admiration climate and that between group admiration 










may be more pronounced under the use of group, rather than individual, incentive pay 
to a greater extent, I propose that groups’ use of higher average proportion of group 
incentive pay will strengthen the positive indirect effects of LMX differentiation on 
group coordination via group admiration climate. By contrast, since LMX 
differentiation is less likely to induce group envy climate under high use of group, 
rather than individual, incentive pay, and group envy climate may likewise impair 
group coordination to a lesser extent under high use of group, rather than individual, 
incentive pay, I hypothesize that groups’ implementation of group incentive pay with 
a higher average proportion will weaken the negative indirect effects of LMX 
differentiation on group coordination through group envy climate. Formally stated:  
Hypothesis 7a: Groups’ use of higher (versus lower) average proportion of 
group (versus individual) incentive pay will strengthen the indirect 
relationship between LMX differentiation and group coordination via group 
climate of admiration. 
Hypothesis 7b: Groups’ use of higher (versus lower) average proportion of 
group (versus individual) incentive pay will weaken the indirect relationship 
between LMX differentiation and group coordination via group climate of 
envy. 
3.8. Effects of Group Coordination on Group Performance 
 Lastly, in consistent with prior research, I propose that effectiveness of group 










concerns integrating individual members’ contributions by developing strategies, 
assigning tasks and resources, and aligning individuals’ disparate actions through 
sequencing and synchronization (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; Marks et al., 2001). A 
group with effective coordination is characterized by its members that have a clear 
understanding of what and how to do and work together smoothly and efficiently 
without process loss (Lewis, 2003; Steiner, 1972). As a result, such well-coordinated 
group tends to accomplish its group tasks effectively and thus exhibit high group 
performance. In support, a number of empirical studies have found a positive 
relationship between groups’ effectiveness of coordination and their performance (see 
for review Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). Therefore, I finally propose the following:  











Chapter 4: Methodology 
  
4.1. Research Site and Sample 
 Empirical investigation of my theoretical framework was conducted using 
data from sales groups in a large electrical appliance retailer in China. It belongs in 
the top 50 Asian companies by Forbes with recent annual revenue and profit around 
10 billion and 300 million dollars, respectively, in 2011. This company provided a 
particularly appropriate research context in that it experimented various kinds of 
incentive pay practices for different sales groups. Put differently, the company used 
group incentive pay for a certain number of sales groups while using individual 
incentive pay for some other groups. I gained access to the entire employees of this 
company through the personal connection of my colleague who works for a 
prestigious business school in China. 
 I administered surveys via the company’s online system with the help of my 
Chinese colleague and human resource (HR) manager of the company to two 
different sources (i.e., group directors and group members) in May, 2012. The 
respondents were informed of the survey objective and procedures, and were assured 
of the voluntary nature of participation and confidentiality of survey responses via the 
cover letter of the surveys. In particular, a coding system was used so that 
respondents did not write their names on the surveys. Each survey carried coding 










system and therefore neither HR manager nor anyone from the company would be 
able to identify any employees individually based on the responses. Then, I obtained 
data on actual sales records of sample groups in November, 2012 along with those in 
May, 2012. I chose the six month time frame because it was the shortest possible one 
for the company to make sales data available to me.  
After all necessary data were collected, my Chinese colleague and I conducted 
data matching processes that merged data from the three different sources (i.e., group 
directors, group members, and sales data archives) to prepare for analyses. As a 
result, I obtained usable data from 828 sales groups and 3,019 group members out of 
1,626 groups and 4,555 members who participated in the survey (51% and 66% 
response rates, respectively). These sales groups were from 650 stores across China. 
Each sales group was responsible for one or multiple products that belonged to three 
categories: (1) traditional (e.g., color TV, audio, refrigerators, washing machines, and 
air conditioning), (2) life (e.g., kitchen, bath, and small home appliance), and (3) 3C 
(i.e., computer and office automation, communication, and consumer electronics). 
Since a large portion of the data was eliminated due to missing values in the 
study variables, I compared the final sample and original sample to examine if the 
data elimination led to any systematic differences in terms of sample groups’ size and 
classification into the three product categories. As a result, I found that the two 
samples had a largely consistent group size (i.e., 9.71 and 8.83 for final and original 
samples, respectively; F(1, 2449) = 7.56, p < .01) and showed almost the same 










sales groups in the final sample and 26%, 42%, and 32% of sales groups in the 
original sample belonged to traditional, life and 3C categories, respectively; F(1, 
5365) = .12, p > .10 for traditional category, F(1, 5365) = .78, p > .10 for life 
category, and F(1, 5365) = .31, p > .10 for 3C category). Therefore, I concluded that 
it is not likely that the data elimination led to meaningful systematic differences 
between the final and original samples.  
4.2. Survey Translation Procedure 
Since the measures in this study were originally in English, I followed an 
iterative translation procedure (Brislin, 1990). My doctoral advisor and Chinese 
colleague, both of whom are Chinese natives, engaged in the iterative process of 
translation and back-translation until no concerns and issues about the Chinese 
version were detected. An English versions of group member and director surveys are 
provided in Appendix B. 
4.3. Measures 
4.3.1. LMX differentiation. LMX was measured by group members using LMX-7 
scale taken from Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995). Sample items include “Regardless of 
how much formal authority he/she has built into his/her position, what are the 
chances that your group leader would use his/her power to help you solve problems 
in your work?” and “Again, regardless of the amount of formal authority your group 
leader has, what are the chances that he/she would “bail you out,” at his/her 










concerns within-group disparity of LMX relationships across group members, I 
calculated the coefficient of variation score (i.e., standard deviation divided by mean) 
from the group members’ ratings of LMX to measure LMX differentiation (Harrison 
& Klein, 2007). 
4.3.2. Group admiration climate. Group admiration climate was measured by 
asking group members to indicate the extent to which they generally feel admiration 
toward each other using six items adapted from Cuddy and colleagues (2007). 
Example items include “admiring,” “respectful,” and “inspired.” Cronbach’s alpha 
was .95. Then, individual group members’ responses were aggregated to group-level. 
This was supported by a high median rwg(j) value of .89 indicating that group 
members in the participating sales groups overall strongly agreed on their assessment 
of admiration climate (LeBreton & Senter, 2008), as well as an ICC(1) value of .17, 
which is considered a medium to large effect (LeBreton & Senter, 2008) and 
indicates that a group membership accounted for 17% of the variance in the 
admiration climate ratings (Bliese, 2002). ICC(2) that indicates the reliability of 
group means was .42, which was relatively low. This can be explained by relatively 
small numbers of responses per group (i.e., average number of group member 
responses per group = 3.65; Bliese, 2002). However, F-test results associated with 
ICC(1) and ICC(2) were statistically significant, F(827, 2191) = 1.73, p < .001, and 
low ICC(2) value makes it difficult to detect relationships involving aggregated 
variables, thereby producing more conservative results (Bliese, 2002).  
4.3.3. Group envy climate. Group envy climate was measured by asking group 










using nine items adapted from Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007). Sample items are 
“a desire to have what others in the sales group have,” “feeling lacking some of the 
things others in the sales group have,” and “envious of each other.” Cronbach’s alpha 
was .96. I aggregated individual group members’ responses to group-level based on 
high median rwg(j) value of .98 and ICC(1) value of .12, a medium to large effect 
(LeBreton & Senter, 2008). As in the group admiration climate, I found relatively 
low ICC(2), i.e., .33, which is again related to the relatively small numbers of 
responses per group (Bliese, 2002), but proceeded to the aggregation based on 
acceptable rwg(j) and ICC(1) values as well as significant F-test results, F(827, 2191) 
= 1.50, p < .001.  
4.3.4. Types of incentive pay. Group leaders indicated types of incentive pay 
practices in their group. I dummy-coded types of incentive pay because the sales 
groups were organized under either group or individual incentive pay practice. In 
addition, it turned out that many of sales groups were rewarded based on the 
combination of individual, group and/or store performance. Thus, these hybrid 
incentive practices (i.e., [1] individual and group performance-based incentive and 
[2] individual, group, and store performance-based incentive pay) were also included 
as dummy variables. In other words, sales groups were using one out of four different 
kinds of incentive pay based on (1) individual performance, (2) group performance, 
(3) individual and group performance, and (4) individual, group, and store 
performance. Individual performance included both individuals’ sales performance 
and subjective performance ratings provided by leader, while all other types of 










performance and store sales performance). I excluded individual incentive pay 
condition as a reference category because the hypotheses in this study concern the 
effects of group incentive pay as compared to individual incentive pay.  
4.3.5. Average proportion of incentive pay. Group members provided a ratio of 
incentive pay in their total compensation (i.e., sum of basic pay and incentive pay). 
Because each member had different levels of basic salary that were determined by 
their position, background, and experiences, they had different proportions of 
incentive pay. Thus, I averaged each group member’s ratio of incentive pay in total 
pay to form group-level average proportion of incentive pay.  
4.3.6. Group coordination. Group coordination was assessed by group members 
using an established five-item scale taken from Lewis (2003). Sample items include 
“our sales group works together in a well-coordinated fashion,” “our sales group does 
not need to backtrack and start over a lot,” and “we integrate our efforts smoothly 
and effectively.” Cronbach’s alpha was .91. Then, I averaged group members’ 
individual ratings to form group coordination. A median rwg(j) was .95 and ICC(1) 
was .16, a medium to large effect, and ICC(2) was .40 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). F-
test results associated with the ICC(1) and ICC(2) were statistically significant, 
F(827, 2191) = 1.68, p < .001.  
4.3.7. Sales performance. I obtained actual sales data through HR manager of the 
company for each of the participating sales groups on two time points. Since the 
survey was administered in May, 2012, the first set of sales data was from May 31, 










to examine the effects of group coordination on lagged T2 sales performance above 
and beyond T1 sales performance. Although the six-month time interval was 
determined by the company based on its sales data collection policy, I believe that the 
six months will give sales groups a sufficient time to realize the benefits of effective 
coordination in the form of increases in sales records. Also, sales figures in the data 
sets indicated relative sales performance that was adjusted for each team’s 
performance evaluation results. They included negative figures that were for sales 
groups that failed to achieve their performance goals.  
4.3.8. Control variables. I controlled for basic demographic variables such as group 
size and three product categories. To better estimate the effects of LMX 
differentiation, I included each group’s average level of LMX as a control (Harrison 
& Klein, 2007). Since the present study aimed to go above and beyond previous 
studies that have largely focused on the roles of justice-related variables in the 
influence processes of LMX differentiation, I controlled for overall justice climate 
(Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Cronbach’s alpha = .98). Further, group members’ 
average levels of social desirability (Bordia, Restubog, & Tang, 2008) were 
controlled because some items for group envy climate could be perceived as 
sensitive. Lastly, T1 sales performance was controlled in estimating the effects of 
group coordination on T2 sales performance to examine if it predicts sales 












4.4. Pilot Study Results 
Before collecting the main data set, I conducted a pilot study in one 
manufacturing company based in Shenzhen, China from January to February in 2012 
because some items for group envy climate contains potentially sensitive content and 
has not been sufficiently investigated in China. Analyses of data from 10 work groups 
and 100 group members revealed that the group envy climate items had adequate 
levels of reliability (i.e., .78) and variability (i.e., mean = 3.86, SD = 1.26). 
4.5. Discriminant Validity 
Since LMX, group admiration climate, group envy climate, and group 
coordination were measured by group members in the same survey, I conducted a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with LISREL 8.80 to assess the distinctiveness 
among them. As a result, I found that the hypothesized four factor model fit the data 
well, Chi-Square (318) = 4,521.73, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .98, and SRMR = .028. This 
was significantly better than alternative three-factor model combining group 
admiration climate and envy climate into a single factor, ∆Chi-Square (3) = 
26,578.11, p < .00, RMSEA = .26, CFI = .85, and SRMR = .22; one-factor model, 
∆Chi-Square (6) = 40,818.94, p < .00, RMSEA = .32, CFI = .78, and SRMR = .19. 
Therefore, I found support for the distinctive validity of the four variables. 
4.6. Analytical Strategy 
To investigate the hypotheses in this study, I conducted a hierarchical 










level. When testing moderated mediation, I examined the indirect effects of LMX 
differentiation on group coordination via group climates of admiration and envy using 
a path analytic method using Mplus 7 (Preacher, Zyphur and Zhang, 2010). In doing 
so, I grand-mean centered all predictors to facilitate interpretations of the findings 










Chapter 5: Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for study variables appear in 
Table 1. First, while LMX differentiation was positively related to group envy climate 
(r = .28, p < .01), it was negatively associated with group admiration climate (r = -.22, 
p < .01). This was not consistent with my expectation given that feelings of 
admiration tend to arise from differences among individuals (Cuddy et al., 2007). 
Group admiration and envy climates were positively and negatively related to group 
coordination, which was consistent with my hypothesis above (r = .54, p < .01 and r = 
-.45, p < .01, respectively). Unexpectedly, group coordination was not significantly 
associated with both T1 and T2 sales performance (r = -.01, p > .10 and r = .00, p > 
.10, respectively). However, these are bivariate correlations without any 
considerations of covariates. Hence, I conducted a series of hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses to test hypotheses in this study. 
5.2. Tests of Hypotheses 
 Table 2 shows the results of hierarchical regression analyses. I first proposed 
that group leaders’ display of LMX differentiation will be positively related to group 
climates of admiration and envy. As shown in the second-hand columns in Models 1 










p > .10 and B = .20, p > .10, respectively). Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were not 
supported.  
 Hypothesis 2 proposed that the main effects of LMX differentiation will be 
moderated by types of incentive pay, such that the effects of LMX differentiation on 
group admiration climate will be more pronounced and those on group envy climate 
will be weaker under group, as opposed to individual, incentive pay (i.e., Hypotheses 
2a and 2b, respectively). The third-hand columns in Models 1 and 2 indicate that 
group (versus individual) incentive pay moderated the effects of LMX differentiation 
on group admiration climate at only marginal level (B = 1.61, p < .10), and did not 
moderate those on group envy climate (B = .75, p > .10). Therefore, I failed to find 
support for Hypothesis 2.  
Next, I proposed three-way interactions among groups’ LMX differentiation, 
types of incentive pay, and average proportion of incentive pay, such that the effects 
of LMX differentiation on group admiration climate will be stronger and those on 
group envy climate will be weaker when groups use group, rather than individual, 
incentive pay with a larger, rather than smaller, proportion (i.e., Hypotheses 3a and 
3b). As shown in the right-hand columns of Models 1 and 2, I found significant three-
way interaction effects among LMX differentiation, group incentive, and average 
proportion of incentive pay on group admiration climate (B = .19, p < .05), but not on 
group envy climate (B = .03, p > .10).  
 To further probe the nature of the three-way interaction, I plotted simple 










low (-1 SD) levels of average proportion of incentive pay. As shown in Figure 2, the 
relationship between LMX differentiation and group admiration climate was 
significantly positive when groups were using group incentive pay with a larger 
proportion (B = 3.37, p < .01). Further, this relationship was significantly stronger 
than the case using group incentive pay with a smaller proportion (B = 2.98, p < .01; 
∆B = .39, p < .05), as well as the cases using individual incentive pay with a larger 
proportion (B = .24, p > .10; ∆B = 3.13, p < .01) and with a smaller proportion (B = 
.21, p > .10; ∆B = 3.16, p < .01). Therefore, I found support for Hypothesis 3a. 
 As auxiliary analyses, I plotted simples slopes under group incentive versus 
hybrid incentive 1 and hybrid incentive 2 with varying proportions of incentive pay. 
As shown in Figure 3, the relationship between LMX differentiation and group 
admiration climate under a larger proportion of group incentive pay was significantly 
greater than those under hybrid incentive 1 with a larger proportion (B = -.29, p > .10; 
∆B = 3.66, p < .01) as well as with a smaller proportion (B = -.12, p > .10; ∆B = 3.49, 
p < .01). Likewise, Figure 4 indicates that the relationship between LMX 
differentiation and group admiration climate under a larger proportion of group 
incentive pay was significantly greater than those under hybrid incentive 2 with a 
larger proportion (B = .43, p > .10; ∆B = 2.94, p < .01) as well as with a smaller 
proportion (B = .41, p > .10; ∆B = 2.96, p < .01).  
As for Hypothesis 3b, the effects of LMX differentiation on group envy 
climate were not significant under group incentive pay with a larger ratio of its use (B 










incentive pay with a lesser ratio of its use (B = 1.14, p < .10; ∆B = ,09, p > .10); as 
well as the cases under individual incentive pay with a larger ratio of its use (B = .18, 
p > .10; ∆B = 1.05, p > .10) and with a lesser extent of its use (B = .14, p > .10; ∆B = 
1.09, p > .10). Hence, Hypothesis 3b was not supported.  
Hypothesis 4 posited positive and negative effects of group admiration climate 
and envy climate on group coordination, respectively. The second-hand column of 
Model 3 in Table 2 shows that group admiration climate was positively related to 
group coordination (B = .19, p < .001) whereas group envy climate was negatively 
associated with it (B = -.14, p < .001). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was supported.  
Next, I posited that the positive effects of group admiration climate on group 
coordination will be more pronounced under group as opposed to individual incentive 
pay (Hypothesis 5a), while the negative effects of group envy climate on group 
coordination will be alleviated under group as opposed to individual incentive pay 
(Hypothesis 5b). The third-hand column of Model 3 shows that group (versus 
individual) incentive pay did not moderate the effects of group admiration climate (B 
= .10, p > .10), failing to support Hypothesis 5a. However, it significantly moderated 
the effects of group envy climate on group coordination in a hypothesized direction 
(B = .28, p < .05).  
To further examine the nature of group envy climate × group (versus 
individual) incentive pay interaction, I plotted the effects of group envy climate on 
group coordination at group versus individual pay conditions. As shown in Figure 5, 










incentive pay (B = .16, p > .10), while it had a significantly negative relationship with 
group coordination under individual incentive pay (B = -.12, p < .01). The difference 
between the two relationships was significant as well (∆B = .28, p < .05). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5b was supported. 
Next, I proposed three-way interactions among group climates of admiration 
and envy, group (versus individual) incentive pay, and average proportion of 
incentive pay, such that the positive effects of group admiration climate on group 
coordination will be more pronounced when using group as opposed to individual 
incentive with a greater proportion (Hypothesis 6a), while the negative effects of 
group envy climate on group coordination will be alleviated when using group rather 
than individual incentive with a greater extent (Hypothesis 6b). As shown in the right-
hand column of Model 3, I failed to find support for the three-way interaction effects 
on group coordination of group admiration climate × group incentive × average 
proportion of incentive pay (B = .00, p > .10) and group envy climate × group 
incentive × average proportion of incentive pay (B = .01, p > .10). Thus, Hypothesis 6 
was not supported. 
Hypothesis 7 proposed moderated mediation effects in which the indirect 
effects of LMX differentiation on group coordination via group admiration climate is 
strengthened when groups use group rather than individual incentive pay with a larger 
proportion, while the indirect effects of LMX differentiation on group coordination 
via group envy climate is weakened when groups use group rather than individual 










group admiration climate when using group incentive pay with a greater proportion 
was .99 (p < .05, 95% confidence interval [.24, 1.74]). This was significantly greater 
than those (1) when using group incentive pay with a smaller proportion (B = .87, p < 
.05; ∆B = .12, p < .05, 95% confidence interval [.02, .22]); (2) when using individual 
incentive pay with a greater proportion (B = .05, p > .10; ∆B  = .94, p < .05,  95% 
confidence interval [.17, 1.72]); and (3) when using individual incentive pay with a 
lesser proportion (B = .04, p > .10, ∆B  = .95, p < .05, 95% confidence interval [.18, 
1.72]). As such, Hypothesis 7a was supported. However, as shown in Table 4, the 
indirect effects of LMX differentiation on group coordination via group envy climate 
were not statistically significant for all conditions of incentive pay and average 
proportion of incentive pay. Further, the differences among the indirect effects were 
not significant as well. Thus, Hypothesis 7b was not supported.  
As supplementary analyses, I compared the indirect effects of LMX 
differentiation on group coordination via group admiration climate under hybrid 
incentive conditions at varying proportions of incentive pay. As a result, I found that 
indirect effects under group incentive pay with a higher ratio of the incentive pay 
were significantly greater than any combinations of hybrid incentive pay practices 
and high and low ratio of incentive pay. These findings further corroborate the role of 
the extent of group incentive as a key boundary condition for the effects of LMX 











Lastly, I proposed that group coordination will be positively related to groups’ 
lagged sales performance. As shown in the right-hand column of Model 4 in Table 2, 
group coordination positively predicted T2 sales performance above and beyond all 
the study and control variables including T1 sales performance (B = 2,898.76, p < 










Chapter 6:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
6.1. Summary of Key Findings 
The purpose of this study was to resolve the puzzle over the divergent 
perspectives and mixed findings on the effects of LMX differentiation by examining 
the joint effects of LMX differentiation and incentive pay practices on group affective 
climates, coordination, and ultimately performance. Analyses of data on 828 sales 
groups in a major home appliance retailer in China revealed that LMX differentiation 
led to group admiration climate when groups received a larger portion of their pay 
based on group, rather than individual or hybrid performance (i.e., individual and 
group performance or individual, group, and store performance). Group admiration 
climate, in turn, enabled effective coordination regardless of types and average 
proportion of incentive pay, while the negative impact of group envy climate on 
group coordination was buffered by the use of group rather than individual or hybrid 
incentive pay. Together, when groups used group incentive pay with a higher 
proportion (with a lower proportion as well though to a lesser extent), LMX 
differentiation was indirectly related to effectiveness of group coordination via group 
admiration climate. Lastly, group coordination positively predicted groups’ six-month 
lagged sales performance above and beyond prior sales performance. These findings 










6.2. Theoretical Implications 
First, the findings in this study contribute to the leadership literature by 
uniquely incorporating emotion theories (Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 2000) to unveil 
groups’ admiration climate as a novel mediator for the effects of LMX differentiation 
on group coordination when the LMX differentiation is accompanied by group 
incentive pay. This suggests that when a leader differentiates among group members, 
group incentive pay needs to integrate the members by rewarding equally based on 
collective performance rather than further differentiate among them by rewarding 
differently based on individual performance. Put differently, since effective 
coordination requires positive coworker relationships (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003), 
leader’s engaging in LMX differentiation that has a potential to disrupt coworker 
relations (Hooper & Martin, 2008; Sherony & Green, 2002) needs to be 
complemented by integrative incentive pay, i.e., group incentive pay, to foster the 
positive relations among members in the form of mutual admiring and then the 
effectiveness of group coordination. Moreover, this finding on the moderating roles 
of incentive pay helps address the mixed effects of LMX differentiation on group 
outcomes by identifying groups’ incentive pay practices as an important boundary 
condition for the effects of LMX differentiation.  
Second, the findings in this study contribute to the compensation literature by 
revealing the effects of incentive pay practices on the emergence and impact of 
groups’ affective climate. Despite the wealth of theories and research on incentive 










(see for review Gerhart et al., 2009). This research suggests that group incentive pay 
may facilitate the occurrence of groups’ admiration climate and buffer the negative 
consequence of their envy climate. This is important because groups’ emotional state 
is a crucial factor affecting other important group processes and ultimately 
performance (Barsade, 2002; Collins, Lawrence, Troth, & Jordan, 2013; Sy et al., 
2005). Further, extant incentive pay research has not paid sufficient attention to the 
effects of incentive pay in small group contexts as in my study (Gerhart et al., 2009). 
Therefore, my findings extend the compensation literature by shedding light on 
unexplored roles of incentive pay practices in enhancing effectiveness of group 
processes and group performance.  
Relatedly, my findings demonstrate that leadership and incentive pay practices 
may go hand in hand in affecting group functioning. Prior research on leadership and 
pay has been developed in isolation from each other and thus has added little to our 
understanding on possible complementary relationships between them. My findings 
show that when a leader differentiates among group members, such differentiated 
treatment needs to be complemented by group incentive pay that can integrate the 
members; otherwise, LMX differentiation may not affect group coordination and 
performance in intended ways. More generally, I suggest that leadership and HR 
practices including incentive pay need to be studied jointly in the future research as 
they constitute two primary managerial practices and their influence processes may 










seminal endeavor linking leadership and HR practices as they influence individual 
and group outcomes.  
Lastly, this study uniquely conceptualizes admiration and envy which have 
been predominantly studied at individual-level as group-level climate constructs, and 
suggests that group admiration and envy climate may serve as important mediating 
mechanisms linking leadership and incentive pay practices to work group outcomes. 
This adds to the limited but emerging body of research on affective climates in work 
groups (e.g., Ashkanasy, & Nicholson, 2003; Tse et al., 2008) by demonstrating the 
presence of affective climates in terms of two social comparison-based emotions, i.e., 
admiration and envy, and their effects on group coordination and performance. Social 
comparison-based emotions cannot be shared entirely by group members as in group 
emotional contagion (e.g., Barsade, 2002) and group affective tone (e.g., Sy et al., 
2005) because some group members should be targets of the emotions (e.g., group 
members admired or envied by other members). However, such emotions can still 
play important roles in group processes by shaping group affective climates, which 
then affect coordination and performance of the groups. As such, this study provides 
further support and promise for conceptualizing group-level emotions as group 
affective climates by unveiling their presence and impact.  
6.3. Alternative Explanations for Unexpected Findings 
Although many of the key hypotheses were supported, I also had a few 










regardless of types and proportions of incentive pay. One possible explanation may 
be that it is not LMX differentiation per se, but the perceived fairness of the LMX 
differentiation that brings about group envy climate. This is based on the results of 
supplementary analysis where LMX differentiation was negatively related to groups’ 
overall justice climate, which then was negatively associated with group envy 
climate. In other words, it is possible that the relationship between LMX 
differentiation and group envy climate is indirect such that it is fully mediated by 
groups’ justice climate. Because groups’ justice climate was controlled in all tests of 
hypotheses, the effects of LMX differentiation on group envy climate may have 
become insignificant. However, the supplementary analysis results suggest that to the 
extent that LMX differentiation undermines groups’ justice climate, it may indirectly 
strengthen group envy climate.  
Second, I did not find support for the 2nd stage moderating effects of group 
(versus individual) incentive pay on the relationship between group admiration 
climate and coordination. No matter what types and proportions of incentive pay 
groups were using, the relationship between them was consistently positive. This may 
be because even when group members were rewarded on the basis of individual 
performance, they did not withdraw from collaborating with admired coworkers to 
learn and benefit from them. In other words, even if group members were motivated 
to pursue their individual performance due to individual incentive pay, they might 
have sufficient reasons to maintain positive work relationships with admired 










advice, and support from the admired coworkers, which in turn could be used to 
enhance their individual performance (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). In this way, the nature 
of incentive pay may not have moderated the relationship between group admiration 
climate and coordination.  
Lastly, the moderating effects of group (versus individual) incentive pay on 
the relationship between group envy climate on group coordination were significant 
regardless of proportions of group incentive pay. In other words, even when groups 
received only small portion of their pay contingent upon group performance, group 
incentive pay could still alleviate the negative effects of envy climate on group 
coordination. This suggests that it is not an intensity of group incentive so much as its 
presence that determines envious group members’ decision about whether or not to 
engage in groups’ coordinative activities. However, given the lack of research on the 
relationship between envy, incentive, and coordination, any explanations for this 
unexpected finding should be speculative at this point. I call for future research to 
further examine this issue by identifying specific mechanisms by which groups’ envy 
climate affects their coordination and performance under different kinds of incentive 
conditions.  
6.4. Practical Implications 
The current study provides several managerial implications. First, it suggests 
that organizations may need to pay more attention to work groups’ emotional states. 










envy had a significant impact on their effective coordination. As such, managers may 
need to regularly monitor, evaluate, and proactively manage groups’ emotional states 
to better ensure effective group coordination and strengthen performance of the 
groups.  
Second, the findings in this study offer implications regarding the choice of 
effective leadership styles in work groups. Specifically, they suggest that group 
managers need to differentiate among group members particularly when incentive pay 
practices are not differentiating. If not, group leader’s engaging in LMX 
differentiation may not only fail to foster group admiration climate and resultant 
effective coordination, but also may impair group coordination by failing to alleviate 
the negative consequences of potential group envy climate.  
Lastly, this research also provides implications about the choice of incentive 
pay schemes in work groups. Specifically, it suggests that HR managers may need to 
implement group incentive pay that can integrate group members when group 
managers are differentially treating their followers and/or group members are 
experiencing relational problems (e.g., envying each other). By contrast, individual 
incentive pay that can differentiate among group members may be more useful when 
group managers are unable to differentiate among them. 
6.5. Limitations and Future Research 
 Despite the above theoretical and practical implications, this study has a few 










my focus on upward social comparison situations (Cuddy et al., 2007; Smith, 2000), 
there might be some other types of group affective climates that could be engendered 
by LMX differentiation. For example, as far as LMX differentiation triggers 
downward social comparisons in work groups, it is possible that LMX differentiation 
may lead to group climates of empathy and contempt (e.g., Tse, Lam, Lawrence, & 
Huang, 2013). Therefore, future research may want to examine more diverse types of 
group affective climates as possible mediating mechanisms for the effects of LMX 
differentiation. 
Second, although I collected data from China due to the importance of leader-
member relations at Chinese workplace (e.g., Chen & Tjosvold, 2007), it is possible 
that my findings may not generalize to other cultural contexts. Although the theories 
behind the current study are not culturally bound, I call for future research to replicate 
the findings in the present study.  
Lastly, because all the data were collected at the same time point except for 
sales performance, the causal order among study variables may be ambiguous. For 
example, it may be that well-coordinated groups may less likely experience group 
envy climate. However, this is at odds with the significantly negative correlation 
between group envy climate and coordination. At any rate, a longitudinal or field 
experimental research design will be needed to better tease out the causal 











 This study aims to resolve a puzzle about the effects of LMX differentiation 
on group functioning by examining groups’ admiration and envy climates as possible 
mediating mechanisms and incentive pay practices as a moderating condition. 
Analyses of data on 828 sales groups in a major Chinese retailor revealed that LMX 
differentiation induced groups’ climate of admiration rather than envy when 
accompanied by the use of group, rather than individual, incentive pay with a high 
proportion in total pay. Group admiration climate in turn significantly related to the 
effectiveness of group coordination that then affected sales performance of the 
groups. Also, group, rather than individual, incentive pay could reduce the negative 
impact of envy climate on group coordination. These findings extend leadership, 
compensation, and emotions literatures and provide several practical implications 
regarding the importance of managing emotions and choices of effective leadership 
styles and pay practices in work groups. I lastly call for future research to replicate 
the findings of this study in different cultural contexts and investigate the occurrence 
and effects of different kinds of group affective climates using a longitudinal or field 
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Appendix B: English Version of Survey Questionnaires 
 
Group Member Survey 
 I. Please provide the following demographic information about yourself.  
1. How old are you?  (    ) years old. 
2. What is your gender? (1) Male (2) Female 
3. Are you married? (1) Yes (2) No 
4. Please indicate your highest educational level attained. 
(1) Some college – no degree 
(2) Two-year college degree (Associates) 
(3) Four-year college degree (Bachelors) 
(4) Post graduate degree – Master’s Degree 
(5) Advanced degree – Ph.D., JD, etc. 
 
II. Please provide the following information about your employer and sales 
team. 
1. Who is your employer? (       ) 
2. What is your rank in your employing organization? (        ) 
3. How long have you been in your employing organization? (    ) months 
4. What product does your sales group sell? (           ) 
5. What is your rank in this sales group? (           ) 
6. How long have you been in your current sales group? (    ) months 
7. How long have you worked with your current sales group leader? (    ) months 
 
III. Please respond to the following questions about your group leader and fellow 
group members. 
1. Do you know where you stand with your group leader  










2. Do you usually know how satisfied your leader is with what you do? 
Rarely / Occasionally / Sometimes / Fairly Often / Very Often 
3. How well does your group leader understand your job problems and needs? 
Not a Bit / A Little / A Fair Amount / Quite a Bit / A Great Deal 
4. How well does your group leader recognize your potential? 
Not at All / A Little / Moderately / Mostly / Fully 
5. Regardless of how much formal authority he/she has built into his/her 
position, what are the chances that your group leader would use his/her power 
to help you solve problems in your work?  
None / Small / Moderate / High / Very High 
6. Again, regardless of the amount of formal authority your group leader has, 
what are the chances that he/she would “bail you out,” at his/her expense? 
None / Small / Moderate / High / Very High 
7. I have enough confidence in my group leader that I would defend and justify 
his/her decision if he/she were not present to do so? 
Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Neutral / Agree / Strongly Agree 
8. How would you characterize your working relationship with your group 
leader? 
Extremely Ineffective / Worse Than Average / Average / Better Than 
Average / Extremely Effective 
 
To what extent does your group leader differentially treat group members based on …  
9. Group members’ job performance 
10. Group members’ contribution to the sales group 
11. Group members’ value to the sales group 
12. Group leader’s personal liking of the group members 
13. Group leader’s personal tie with the group members 











In a typical week, to what extent do you agree to the following items that describe 
your general emotions toward other group members at work? 
1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree 
15. I feel envy toward other members in my sales group. 
16. The bitter truth is that I generally feel inferior to other group members at 
work. 
17. Feelings of envy constantly torment me at work. 
18. It is so frustrating to see some people in my sales group succeed so easily at 
work. 
19. No matter what I do, envy always plagues me in my sales group. 
20. I am troubled by feelings of inadequacy as compared to other group members 
at work. 
21. It somehow doesn’t seem fair that some group members seem to have all the 
talent. 
22. Frankly, the success of my coworkers at work makes me resent them. 
 
In a typical week, to what extent do you generally feel the following emotions toward 
other group members at work?  




















33. contemptuous  
34. disgust 
35. disdainful  
36. angry 
37. irritated 
38. hostile  
 
1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 
39. Overall, my group members are treated fairly by group leader. 
40. In general, my group members can count on group leader to be fair. 
41. In general, the treatment my group members receive from group leader is fair. 
42. Usually, the ways things work with my group leader are fair. 
43. For the most part, my group leader treats his/her group members fairly. 
44. Most of the group members would say they are treated fairly by my group 
leader. 
 
True or False 
45. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
46. I always try to practice what I preach. 
47. I never resent being asked to return a favor. 
48. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my 
own. 
49. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 
50. I like to gossip at times. 
51. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
52. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
53. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 











IV. Please respond to the following questions about the characteristics of your 
sales group. 
 
In a typical week, to what extent do the following items accurately describe your 
group members’ general emotions toward each other at work? 
1 = not characteristic at all, 9 = extremely characteristic 
55. Some hatred toward each other 
56. They have a grudge (resentment, bitterness) against each other 
57. Rancor (resentment, ill will) toward each other 
58. Bitter toward each other  
59. Gall (irritated, annoyed) toward each other 
60. A desire to have what others in the sales group have  
61. Feeling lacking some of the things others in the sales group have 
62. Others in the sales group have things going better than they do 
63. Envious of each other 
 
In a typical week, to what extent do your group members generally feel the following 
emotions toward each other at work?  




















74. contemptuous  
75. disgust 





80. Please indicate the proportion of incentive pay based on your individual 
performance in your total pay. (     )% 
81. Please indicate the proportion of incentive pay based on your group 
performance in your total pay. (     )% 
 
1 = to a very small extent, to 7 = to a very large extent 
82. Group members receive incentives based on their individual performance.  
83. Group members’ incentive plans are based primarily on individual 
performance.  
84. Group members’ compensation is contingent on individual performance. 
85. Group members’ pay is closely tied to individual performance. 
 
1 = to a very small extent, to 7 = to a very large extent 
86. Group members receive incentives based on their group performance.  
87. Group members’ incentive plans are based primarily on group performance.  
88. Group members’ compensation is contingent on group performance. 
89. Group members’ pay is closely tied to group performance. 
 
1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree 
90. Our sales group works together in a well-coordinated fashion. 
91. Our sales group has very few misunderstandings about what to do. 










93. We integrate our efforts smoothly and effectively. 
94. There is little confusion about how we would accomplish our group task. 
 
1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree 
My group members and I: 
95. Always find support from the sales group  
96. Volunteer help to each other, even when not asked 
97. Cover for each other in times of need  
98. Know what the sales group expects from each one of us 
99. Feel comfortable asking for support from one another 
100. Work toward the sales group’s goals, even if it might negatively affect 
personal goals 
101. Willingly stay late to help each other 
102. Celebrate career milestones of one another 
103. Provide feedback to members who fall short of the sales group’s 
expectations 
 
1 = never, 7 = all the time 
How often have your group members intentionally… 
104. Criticized each other in front of other members? 
105. Ignored each other? 
106. Talked down to each other? 
107. Went back on their word? 
108. Gave each other the silent treatment? 
109. Belittled each other or each other’s ideas? 
110. Did not listen to each other? 
 
1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree 










unless everyone contributes. 
112. When we work together in our sales group, everyone's ideas are needed if 










Appendix B: English Version of Survey Questionnaires 
(continued) 
 
Group Director Survey 
 
I. Please provide the following demographic information about yourself.  
1. How old are you?  (    ) years old. 
2. What is your gender? (1) Male (2) Female 
3. Are you married? (1) Yes (2) No 
4. Please indicate your highest educational level attained. 
(1) Some college – no degree 
(2) Two-year college degree (Associates) 
(3) Four-year college degree (Bachelors) 
(4) Post graduate degree – Master’s Degree 
(5) Advanced degree – Ph.D., JD, etc. 
5. What is your rank in this organization?  
6. How long have you been in your sales group? (    ) months 
7. How long have you been in your current organization? (    ) months 
8. How many members (except you) does your sales group have? (    ) 
 
II. Please respond to the following questions about each of your members in 
your sales group. 
1. Do you let this employee know where s/he stand with you … do you usually 
let this employee know how satisfied you are with what s/he does?  
 (1 = rarely, 2 = occasionally, 3 = sometimes, 4 = fairly often, 5 = very often) 
2. How well do you understand this employee’s job problems and needs?  
 (1 = not a bit, 2 = a little, 3 = a fair amount, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = a great deal) 










 (1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = moderately; 4 = mostly; 5 = fully) 
4. Regardless of how much formal authority you has built into your position, 
what are the chances that you would use your power to help this employee 
solves problems in his/her work? 
 (1 = none, 2 = small, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, 5 = very high) 
5. Again, regardless of the amount of formal authority you have, what are the 
chances that you would “bail this employee out,” at your expense? 
 (1 = none, 2 = small, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, 5 = very high) 
6. I have enough confidence in this employee that I would defend and justify 
his/her decision if he/she were not present to do so?  
 (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) 
7. How would you characterize your working relationship with this employee?  
 (1 = extremely ineffective; 2 = worse than average; 3 = average; 4 = better 
than average; 5 =  extremely effective) 
 
III. Please respond to the following questions about the characteristics of your 
sales group. 
 
8. Please indicate the proportion of incentive pay based on group members’ 
individual performance in their total pay. (     )% 
9. Please indicate the proportion of incentive pay based on your sales group’s 
performance in individual group members’ total pay. (     )% 
 
1 = to a very small extent, to 7 = to a very large extent 
10. Group members receive incentives based on their individual performance.  
11. Group members’ incentive plans are based primarily on individual 
performance.  
12. Group members’ compensation is contingent on individual performance. 











1 = to a very small extent, to 7 = to a very large extent 
14. Group members receive incentives based on the performance of our sales 
group.  
15. Group members’ incentive plans are based primarily on the performance of 
our sales group.  
16. Group members’ compensation is contingent on the performance of our sales 
group. 














Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
  
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Group size 9.71 7.42        
2. Traditional product category 0.43 0.50   .07       
3. Life product category 0.31 0.46 .18** -.58**      
4. Group mean LMX 5.58 0.60  -.01   -.01 .03     
5. Overall justice climate 5.63 0.65  -.01   -.04 .06 .88**    .98   
6. Social desirability 0.69 0.10  -.06   -.06 .05 -.12** -.12**   
7. LMX differentiation 0.12 0.11   .04   -.01 .03 -.59** -.55** .09*  
8. Individual incentive 0.32 0.47   .06   -.02 .04    .02   -.01   -.01   -.05 
9. Group incentive 0.06 0.25   .08*    .00    -.02    .00    .01   -.04    .01 
10. Hybrid incentive 1  0.15 0.35  -.08*   -.07  .07*    .00    .01    .02    .02 
11. Hybrid incentive 2  0.45 0.50  -.04    .06 -.08*   -.02    .00    .00    .02 
12. Fixed salary  0.02 0.12  -.02    .05    -.02   -.01    .02    .04    .01 
13. Average proportion of incentive pay 25.75 18.51   .04    .06    -.01  .10**    .05    .00 -.10** 
14. Group admiration climate 4.60 0.96   .06    .06 .02  .42**  .41** -.15** -.22** 
15. Group envy climate 1.85 0.68   .01   -.06 .03 -.43** -.42**  .14**  .28** 
16. Group coordination 5.46 0.68   .01    .02 .04  .71**  .71** -.14** -.40** 
17. T1 sales performance  18,848.94 20,322.70   .53**  .37**    -.02   -.01    .00    .02    .05 
18. T2 sales performance 23,208.54 25,337.91   .48**  .50**   -.15**   -.03   -.04   -.03    .06 
Note. N = 828. PASW 18 was used. Hybrid incentive 1 refers to group and individual performance-based incentive pay; hybrid 
incentive 2 refers to group, individual, and store performance-based incentive pay. Cronbach’s alpha values appear in italics on the 
diagonal. 
    * p < .05 











TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Group size           
2. Traditional product category           
3. Life product category           
4. Group mean LMX           
5. Justice climate           
6. Social desirability           
7. LMX differentiation           
8. Individual incentive           
9. Group incentive -.18**          
10. Hybrid incentive 1  -.29** -.11**         
11. Hybrid incentive 2  -.63** -.24** -.37**        
12. Fixed salary   -.09*  -.03  -.05 -.11**       
13. Average proportion of incentive pay   .04   .06  -.02  -.06 -.03      
14. Group admiration climate   .05  -.06  -.02   .00  .03   .04   .95    
15. Group envy climate  -.03  -.03   .01   .03  .01  -.05 -.28** .96   
16. Group coordination  -.03   .01   .01   .02 -.02   .06   .54**    -.45**    .91  
17. T1 sales performance   .04  .09**  -.05  -.03 -.05   .08*   .06 .02   -.01  
18. T2 sales performance   .05   .08*  -.06  -.04 -.01   .07   .05 .03    .00 .80** 
Note. N = 828. PASW 18 was used. Hybrid incentive 1 refers to group and individual performance-based incentive pay; hybrid 
incentive 2 refers to group, individual, and store performance-based incentive pay. Cronbach’s alpha values appear in italics on the 
diagonal. 
    * p < .05 

















DV = Group admiration climate 
Model 2  
DV = Group envy climate  
Intercept 4.62*** 4.63*** 4.64*** 4.64*** 1.83*** 1.81*** 1.81*** 1.81*** 
Control variables         
Group size .00   .00   .00   .00   .00   .00  .00   .00 
Traditional product category  -.06  -.06  -.06  -.06   .03   .03  .03   .04 
Life product category .04   .04   .04   .04  -.03  -.03 -.03  -.03 
Group mean LMX .42***   .45***   .44***   .46***  -.31***  -.28*** -.28***  -.29*** 
Justice climate .27**   .28** .29**   .27**  -.19**  -.19** -.19**  -.18* 
Social desirability -.06  -.05   .00   .01  -.24  -.23 -.21  -.24 
T1 sales .00   .00   .00   .00   .00   .00  .00   .00 
Predictors         
Group incentive -.31*  -.32*  -.30*  -.25   -.04 -.04  -.03 
Hybrid incentive 1 -.08  -.09  -.08  -.11    .04  .04   .05 
Hybrid incentive 2 -.05  -.05  -.06  -.06    .04  .04   .04 
Fixed salary  -.31  -.32  -.33  -.33    .09  .00   .01 
Average proportion of incentive pay  .00   .00   .00   .00    .00  .00   .00 
LMX differentiation    .45   .22   .21    .20  .13   .15 
1st stage two-way interaction          
LMX differentiation × Group incentive    1.61  2.91*    .75  1.01 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 1     -.36   -.44   -.47   -.45 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 2      .21    .21    .06   -.06 










LMX differentiation × Average proportion of 
incentive pay 
     .00    .02    .01    .02 
Group incentive × Average proportion of 
incentive pay 
     .00    .01    .00    .00 
Hybrid incentive 1 × Average proportion of 
incentive pay 
     .01    .00    .00    .00 
Hybrid incentive 2 × Average proportion of 
incentive pay 
     .01    .01    .00    .00 
Fixed salary × Average proportion of incentive 
pay 
     .01    .01    .01    .01 
1st stage three-way interaction          
LMX differentiation × Group incentive ×  
Average proportion of incentive pay 
      .19*       .03 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 1 ×  
Average proportion of incentive pay 
     -.11       .03 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 2 ×  
Average proportion of incentive pay 
     -.01      -.04 
LMX differentiation × Fixed salary ×  
Average proportion of incentive pay 
     -.01       .03 
R2 .20***   .20***   .21***    .22*** .20***   .20***  .21***    .21*** 
∆R2     .00   .01    .01*    .00  .01    .01 
Note. N = 828. PASW 18 was used. Unstandardized coefficients are reported.  
    * p < .05 
  ** p < .01 
*** p < .001 










TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
Hierarchical Regression Results 
 
 
Model 3  
DV = Group coordination 
Model 4  
DV = T2 sales performance  
Intercept 5.45*** 4.83*** 4.77*** 4.78***   4,436.70  -9,426.24 
Control variables       
Group size   .00   .00   .00   .00 278.62***   271.99*** 
Traditional product category   -.02   .00   .00   .00  -1,215.95  -1,212.67 
Life product category   .00  -.02  -.02  -.02      452.32      498.23 
Group mean LMX   .44***   .31**   .31***   .30***      382.81     -493.38 
Justice climate   .41***   .34**   .34***   .34***  -1,837.08   -2,836.99 
Social desirability   .10   .06   .08   .06   9,551.43    9,374.11 
T1 sales performance   .00   .00   .00   .00            .93***           .94*** 
Predictors       
Group incentive   .05   .09   .12   .13  -1,282.99    -1,653.63 
Hybrid incentive 1   .05   .07   .08   .08  -1,949.73    -2,181.08 
Hybrid incentive 2   .04   .06   .06   .06  -1,199.09    -1,369.04 
Fixed salary   -.04   .02   .00   .04    1,884.52     1,764.34 
Average proportion of incentive pay   .00   .00   .00   .00         80.38          85.84 
LMX differentiation   .19   .17   .18   .15      720.58 292.09 
Group admiration climate    .19***   .19***   .19***       394.35 -167.71 
Group envy climate   -.14***  -.12**  -.12**       240.55  602.61 
Group coordination      2,898.76* 










LMX differentiation × Group incentive    .89  .48   -.39   -.46   -1,631.99 -300.86 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 1   -.01  .01    .20    .11  12,466.57    12,144.41 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 2    .10  .05    .02    .01    1,311.03 1,276.23 
LMX differentiation × Fixed salary -1.93 -.94 -1.91 -1.18 -38,003.74   -34,581.01 
LMX differentiation × Average proportion of incentive 
pay 
   .01  .01    .01    .01    1,791.12** 1,766.22 
Group incentive × Average proportion of incentive pay    .01  .00    .00    .01         64.89     47.87 
Hybrid incentive 1 × Average proportion of incentive 
pay 
   .01*  .01*    .01*    .01*        -85.71 -106.67 
Hybrid incentive 2 × Average proportion of incentive 
pay 
   .00  .00    .00    .00        -94.28 -101.95 
Fixed salary × Average proportion of incentive pay    .00  .00    .00    .00        -51.41  -60.12 
1st stage three-way interaction        
LMX differentiation × Group incentive × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
   .02 -.01  -.04  -.08    -2,491.22    -2,250.49 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 1 × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
   .01  .03   .04   .03       -264.05 -350.43 
LMX differentiation × Hybrid incentive 2 × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
  -.01 -.01  -.01  -.01     -1,393.32    -1,369.56 
LMX differentiation × Fixed salary × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
   .07  .07   .07   .09     -3,032.67    -3,279.93 
2nd stage two-way interaction        
Group admiration climate × Group incentive     .10   .10     -3,570.02    -3,853.45 
Group admiration climate × Hybrid incentive 1     .02   .02       2,258.52     2,205.02 
Group admiration climate × Hybrid incentive 2    -.04  -.04    29.96 153.03 
Group admiration climate × Fixed salary    -.10  -.07      -4,862.81    -4,667.65 
Group admiration climate × Average proportion of 
incentive pay 










Group envy climate × Group incentive      .28*   .26*       1,774.80     1,008.88 
Group envy climate × Hybrid incentive 1    -.10  -.09        -312.41        -62.86 
Group envy climate × Hybrid incentive 2    -.02  -.03        -287.46      -192.74 
Group envy climate × Fixed salary     .09   .04     -1,500.47   -1,630.79 
Group envy climate × Average proportion of incentive 
pay  
     .00        -100.31      -106.57 
2nd stage three-way interaction        
Group admiration climate × Group incentive × 
Average proportion of incentive pay 
     .00 -19.66 -20.42 
Group admiration climate × Hybrid incentive 1 × 
Average proportion of incentive pay 
     .00    3.01    8.22 
Group admiration climate × Hybrid incentive 2 × 
Average proportion of incentive pay 
     .00        -122.97      -121.64 
Group admiration climate × Fixed salary × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
    -.01 225.24       250.29 
Group envy climate × Group incentive × Average 
proportion of incentive pay  
     .01 272.92       243.94 
Group envy climate × Hybrid incentive 1 × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
     .00 150.00       147.58 
Group envy climate × Hybrid incentive 2 × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
     .00  49.91 64.24 
Group envy climate × Fixed salary × Average 
proportion of incentive pay 
    -.01 460.70 494.47 
R2 .55***   .62***   .63***   .63***             .65***              .66*** 
∆R2     .07***   .01*   .00               .01* 
Note. N = 828. PASW 18 was used. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Two tailed test. 
    * p < .05 
  ** p < .01 

































(1) Group incentive pay ×  
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
 3.37** .29***  .99* [.24, 1.74] 
(2) Group incentive pay ×  
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
 2.98** .29***  .87* [.18, 1.56] 
(3) Individual incentive pay × 
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.24 .19*** .05 [-.17, .26] 
(4) Individual incentive pay × 
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.21 .19*** .04 [-.17, .25] 
(5) Hybrid incentive pay 1 × 
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
       -.29 .21***        -.06 [-.37, .25] 
(6) Hybrid incentive pay 1 ×  
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
       -.12 .21***        -.03 [-.34, .28] 
(7) Hybrid incentive pay 2 × 
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.43 .15*** .06 [-.07, .20] 
(8) Hybrid incentive pay 2 ×  
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.41 .15*** .06 [-.07, .20] 
Difference tests     
(1) – (2) .39* .00  .12* [.02, .22] 
(1) – (3) 3.13** .10  .94* [.17, 1.72] 
(1) – (4) 3.16** .10  .95* [.18, 1.72] 
(1) – (5) 3.66** .08 1.05* [.25, 1.85] 
(1) – (6) 3.49** .08 1.02* [.22, 1.82] 
(1) – (7) 2.94** .14  .93* [.17,1.68] 










Note. N = 828. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Mplus 7 was used. Hybrid incentive pay 
1 refers to an incentive pay based on individual and group performance. Hybrid incentive pay 2 
refers to an incentive pay based on individual, group, and store performance.  
    * p < .05 
  ** p < .01 
*** p < .001 






























(1) Group incentive pay ×  
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
       1.23        .14  .18 [-.15, .50] 
(2) Group incentive pay ×  
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
       1.14        .12  .14 [-.15, .42] 
(3) Individual incentive pay × 
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.18 -.12** -.02 [-.12, .08] 
 
(4) Individual incentive pay × 
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.14 -.13** -.02 [-.12, .08] 
(5) Hybrid incentive pay 1 × 
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
-.24 -.22**  .05 [-.17, .28] 
(6) Hybrid incentive pay 1 ×  
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
-.35 -.22**  .08 [-.15, .31] 
(7) Hybrid incentive pay 2 × 
high average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.08 -.16** -.01 [-.11, .09] 
(8) Hybrid incentive pay 2 ×  
low average proportion of 
incentive pay 
.11 -.15** -.02 [-.11, .08] 
Difference tests     
(1) – (2)   .09        .02 .04 [-.03, .10] 
(1) – (3) 1.05 .26* .20 [-.14, .54] 
(1) – (4) 1.09 .27* .20 [-.15, .53] 
(1) – (5) 1.47   .36** .13 [-.27, .52] 
(1) – (6) 1.58   .36** .10 [-.30, .50] 
(1) – (7) 1.15   .30** .19 [-.16, .53] 
(1) – (8) 1.12   .29** .20 [-.15, .53] 
Note. N = 828. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Mplus 7 were used. Hybrid incentive 
pay 1 refers to an incentive pay based on individual and group performance. Hybrid incentive 










    * p < .05 
  ** p < .01 





























Three-way Interaction Effects of LMX Differentiation × Group (versus Individual) 













Three-way Interaction Effects of LMX Differentiation × Group (versus Hybrid 1) Incentive 
















Three-way Interaction Effects of LMX Differentiation × Group (versus Hybrid 2) Incentive 


















Two-way Interaction Effects of Group Envy Climate × Group (versus Individual) Incentive 
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